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In the preface to Models of discovery and creativity, Thomas Nickles pitches the
book as the continuation of a research program that began unofficially at a
conference on scientific discovery in the late 1970’s. The project is defined by its
interdisciplinary nature, applying the combined resources of philosophy, social
science, and cognitive science to the complex issues surrounding scientific concepts,
practice, and methodology. Nickles offers the current volume as an update on the
status of the program. All aspects of the project are present in the collected papers,
which showcase an impressive array of analytical skills and historical expertise.
If read as a unified project, the aims of the contributors are extremely
ambitious—the present volume suggests no less than an attempt to create a cross-
disciplinary methodology for the analysis of scientific creativity and conceptual
change. Analytical tools range from formal models of reasoning (Magnani,
Sintonen), evolutionary computation (Nickles), and philosophical and cognitive
theories of concepts (Brown, Nersessian); to detailed research into the daily
experimental activities of scientists (Holmes), and analysis of personal cooperation
and competition amongst researchers in contexts of discovery (Werner). The variety
of scientific fields and episodes discussed borders on astounding, ranging from the
discoveries of nuclear fission (Andersen) and messenger RNA (Darden), to the
construction of concepts and proofs in geometry and algebra (Glas).
At first glance, it would seem impossible that experts in such a variety of fields
should be employing anything like a unified methodology, or approaching a unified
goal. It might be suspected that the volume is simply a grouping of a variety of
really independent projects analyzing science from the distinct fields of philosophy
of science, cognitive science, and science studies. However, there is a shared
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perspective to be gleaned from the volume, which involves a shared commitment to
assessing science from an empirical viewpoint. Let us call this the ‘naturalism’
perspective. The goal of the naturalism perspective is to give detailed accounts of
science that reflect the on-the-ground practices of scientists. This entails replacing a
number of cherished philosophical habits with the analytical tools mentioned above.
One such abandoned habit is that of construing science entirely in terms of abstract
theories individuated by their logical structure.1 Several authors (Darden, Glas) also
repudiate the distinction between discovery and justification (Nickles, p. 190, is a
possible exception), a standard viewpoint that has often allowed philosophers to
ignore the practical elements of scientific progress in favor of a logical analysis of
the justification for holding a particular theory. One of the recurring themes of the
book is that, under the naturalism perspective, there are no such clear distinctions to
be made in analyzing actual scientific practice—any phenomenon of scientific
reasoning is going to be complex and multi-faceted, and real understanding how
science works depends on an understanding of actual scientists in actual cognitive
and social contexts. The commitment to cross-disciplinary projects and historical
analysis stems from this position.
Laudably, this shared commitment supplies us with several well-thought-out
frameworks for analyzing both (i) the conceptual structures involved in scientific
thought; and (ii) the practices of constructing explanations and discovering
anomalies. The most well-developed proposal for (i) is provided by Nersessian, who
for several years has been promoting a view of scientific concepts inspired by
Johnson-Laird’s (1983, 2004) account of ‘model-based reasoning’ (MBR). As
applied to science by Nersessian, MBR claims that scientific concepts are iconic
representations of a target domain that embody structural constraints isomorphic
(or homomorphic) to those present in that domain. Reasoning with models consists of
running representational ‘simulations’ (p. 141) of the behavior of the target domain.
Creativity and concept change are processes of modifying the constraints present in
the representational model so as to produce different behavior in simulation.
Brown provides an alternate view based on Sellars’ theory of empirical concepts.
On the Sellarsian view, concepts are characterized by ‘entry transitions’ and ‘local
holisms’. An entry transition is the cognitive process of transforming an ability to
recognize an item or class into the ability to make inferences about the item or class.
Local holisms are the particular set of inferences that are drawn in relation to the
concept. On this scheme, concept change consists in modifying the set of inferences
that one is disposed to make with the concept. Finally, Andersen reprises Kuhn’s
theory of categorization by similarity class, on which concepts are feature lists that
are used to group similar objects together. Change consists in modifying the feature
lists to produce new taxonomies. While these theories differ both in focus and in
implications, it is clear that they share a commitment to explaining scientific
concepts in a naturalistic way.
1 Even the broadly model-theoretic perspective offered by Sintonen emphasizes the hierarchical and
flexible nature of theories, and recognizes (although not unreservedly) the relevance of cognitive science
for understanding creativity and conceptual change (see p. 213).
116 Metascience (2012) 21:115–118
123
Element (ii) of the naturalism perspective deals with hypothesis generation, theory
construction, anomaly resolution, and discovery.2 Once again, a number of useful
frameworks are to be found. Darden argues that giving explanations in biology
consists of constructing ‘mechanism sketches’—abstract representations that specify
the functional or causal roles in a mechanistic system—and then ‘filling in’ the
sketch with entities and sub-processes to produce a completed ‘mechanism schema’.
Anomalies are unfulfilled or unclear roles in a mechanism schema, and discovery
occurs when an entity is specified that solves the anomaly. Quite strongly, Darden
argues that mechanism schemas simply are the theories that biologists construct.
Abductive reasoning is a focus of several of the essays. One of the persistent
criticisms of positivistic and deductive views of science has been that purely deductive
systems leave the generation of new content a complete mystery. Both Kleiner
and Magnani attempt to fill this theoretical gap via abduction, which is an ampliative
type of inference, in that it generates novel content out of possessed content. On
Kleiner’s view, abduction is a constraint on hypothesis generation, in which one’s
previously possessed concepts and explanations both provide an analogical basis
for new hypotheses and limit the range of plausible hypotheses by generating abstract
principles (e.g., about types of causes and the properties of natural kinds) which can be
applied to new domains. Novelty then emerges from the new applications. Magnani’s
focus is on incorporating abduction within a broader view of scientific epistemology.
He argues that, in addition to generating new hypotheses, abduction also forms the
basis for inference to the best explanation. Both accounts point out that while there
may be no ‘logic’ to discovery, this does not make it intractable, as abduction is a
reasoned process that can be reconstructed with careful analysis.
Nickles gives a more deflationary account of theory change, relying both on
Popper’s evolutionary epistemology and on results from research on evolutionary
computation. Evolutionary epistemology argues that the generation of new hypotheses
parallels the generation of new phenotypes, in that it consists of random generation of
new material that is then selectively retained due to producing some degree of fitness
(in this case, explanatory value). Evolutionary computation has shown that successive
random re-combinations of computer code, when combined with a parameter for
fitness and a mechanism of selective retention, can eventually produce programs
capable of solving even sophisticated engineering problems. Nickles argues that
scientific progress occurs in largely the same way. While once again there are
differences between these proposals, they clearly share the naturalism perspective.
Where does the project stand, then, as a unified approach to understanding
science? A nebulous shared perspective, interesting though it may be, does not a
methodology make, and a number of obstacles stand between the current project and
a unified viewpoint. The first, of course, is the very breadth of tools and phenomena
under discussion. It is often unclear how the accounts offered here fit together, even
in cases where it seems intuitive that they would do so. For instance, is Darden’s
process of mechanistic explanation realized cognitively by something like
2 Unsurprisingly, this element is closely related to (i). For instance, Andersen attempts to account for the
generation of anomalies and the difference between expected and unexpected discoveries via the amount
and type of revision that they demand of an existing taxonomic framework. However, I separate these
aspects from element (i) because their focus is more on practice than on conceptual structure or content.
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Nersessian’s MBR view? This would seem to be a reasonable position, but the
question is not addressed, and it is unclear that the model-based view (as compared
to, say, an inferentialist view such as Brown’s) is the only or best cognitive account
to conjoin with Darden’s theory of explanatory practice.
A similar concern arises in the papers that discuss specific scientific episodes. The
structure of several of these is to offer and explain a framework, F, for understanding
some aspect of science, followed by an illustration of some episode, E, from the history
of science, which it is supposed to elucidate or explain. But the fact that one can
justifiably apply F to E at best shows that F is a possible way of understanding E, not
that it is the only or best way. Alternate models are rarely discussed in the individual
papers. This is to say nothing of cases in which the accounts straightforwardly
disagree. As already mentioned, Nickles’ evolutionary framework disagrees with the
abductive views of Kleiner and Magnani on the level of randomness involved in theory
change. To take another example: Nersessian endorses a ‘continuum hypothesis’ (p.
128), on which scientific concepts and reasoning are on a continuum with their
everyday counterparts, while Brown argues that we have distinct conceptual systems
for folk and theoretical modes of reasoning. Examples could be added, but these
suffice to show that there are deep differences between the accounts on offer here.
What these considerations suggest is that the research program is still in its
formative stages, despite Nickles’ announcement of its 30th anniversary. If the
current volume is any indication, the attention is still on constructing the tools
necessary for this type of analysis—tools that take the naturalism perspective
seriously and attempt to combine the resources of multiple disciplines in its pursuit.
Given the thoughtfulness and depth of the models on offer in the book, it seems as
though this stage is nearing fruition. What remains, then, is to compare the
frameworks presented, arguing out both their internal differences and their possible
applications. Of course, once this work is embarked on, there may turn out to be
competing methodologies within the naturalism perspective, perhaps emerging from
different ways of combining and prioritizing the current models. This would be an
undeniably good thing, as it would foster specific, issue-focused dialectic that would
further the understanding of the entire perspective.
Far from being a downfall of the book, these issues show that it succeeds as an
excellent window into the state of a broad theoretical endeavor—the understanding
of science from the naturalism perspective. The book contains a wealth of interesting
models and questions for further consideration. If the field is not yet mature, it has at
least reached the point where we can be excited about the potential it holds.
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